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Were Fed’s Active Monetary Policy Actions Necessary? 
1. Introduction 
Vector autoregression (VAR) has been used to analyze the effects of monetary policy 
by relating the variables of interest to the structural economic shocks. In the VAR 
framework, we can identify the effects of policy if we can identify the structural 
economic shocks. Dynamic policy effects can then be computed via the impulse 
response functions. The advantage of such an exercise is that we do not need to 
identify the dynamic structure of the economic model. However, there have been 
disagreements on how to identify these policy shocks appropriately (see Christiano, 
Eichenbaum, and Evans, 2000 for a survey of the alternatives).  
The VARs usually employ only a few variables because of constraints arising from the 
degrees of freedom considerations. As mentioned in Bernanke, Boivin and Eliasz 
(2005) (hereafter BBE), the standard VAR usually contains only six to eight variables. 
However, as far as monetary policy is concerned, central banks in reality exploit 
hundreds of data series to make their decisions on monetary policies. The small 
number of variables in the VAR analysis cannot span the information set used by 
central banks. This leads to the problem of omitting variables that contain information 
about the structural economic shocks in the standard VAR analysis. Leeper, Sims, and 
Zha (1996) tried larger VARs through the use of Bayesian priors that contained 
thirteen and eighteen variables. However increasing the number of variables in a VAR 
creates low efficiency of estimation; moreover, using less than twenty variables is still 
unacceptably less than the hundreds of time series actually used by central banks. In 
short, the low dimension of the VAR is not practicable in the analysis of actual 
monetary policy dynamics.  
The recent development of factor models provides a solution to this dimensionality 
problem of the VAR. In general, the idea of the factor model is to summarize the 
information embedded in a large dataset into a small number of factors and apply 
these factors to conventional econometric models. Stock and Watson (2002) 
developed a dynamic factor model which uses the principal components analysis to 
extract information from a large dataset. They applied the model in forecasting, and 
showed that forecasts based on dynamic factor models outperform the AR models, 
VAR models and leading indicator models. Bernanke and Boivin (2003) confirmed 
Stock and Watson‟s result that using large data sets can improve the accuracy of 
forecasts. They also improved the estimation of the U.S. Fed‟s policy reaction 
function using the large dataset. 
BBE (2005) suggested a factor-augmented VAR model to incorporate a large amount 
of information in VAR without including too many variables. They combined the 
standard VAR with factor analysis. Two approaches were introduced, the two-step 
approach and the Bayesian method based on Gibbs sampling. The two approaches 
produced similar qualitative results. However the two-step approach tended to 
produce more reasonable impulse response functions. In the two-step approach, large 
amounts of information about the economy were first summarized by a small number 
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of estimated factors using the Stock and Watson (2002) method. These estimated 
factors were then used in the factor-augmented VAR. Consequently, this setup 
alleviates the dimensionality problem of the VAR analysis.  
This paper applies the two-stage FAVAR developed by BBE (2005) to investigate the 
appropriateness of frequent monetary policy actions - adjusting the interest rate 
frequently and in a prolonged manner. There have often been claims that the Federal 
Reverse Bank cuts or raises the Fed Funds Rate too frequently. The concern is that  
that the Federal Reserve Bank had mistakenly first cut the interest rate too frequently 
and for too long a period, and then had overcompensated by increasing the interest 
rate too fast and too soon. To verify if such a claim is valid, assuming that the Federal 
Reserve Bank had shortened the time period of monetary policies and lengthened the 
period of a pause, we generate some hypothetical scenarios. We then compare the 
economic activities implied by the impulse response functions from our hypothetical 
scenarios with those that are generated from actual policies undertaken by the Fed 
during the time of Alan Greenspan (1987-2006). We find that a less active monetary 
policy approach could control inflation with less negative impact on real economic 
activities, and that the major economic variables would be less volatile in a 48-month 
horizon.  
This paper is different from Bernanke and Boivin (2003)‟s real-time expert system for 
monetary policy-making in two ways. First, the FAVAR had not been developed in the 
2003 paper yet, but a pilot version of the model was used in the paper, which was 
called Factor Model plus Vector Autoregression (FM-VAR) by the authors. This was 
also a 2-step model, but in the second step the authors included the factors, inflation, 
unemployment, and the federal funds rate, in that order.  The inclusion of the last 
three variables in the VAR is equivalent to treating these variables as independent 
factors without idiosyncratic errors. This is the key difference between the FM-VAR 
and the FAVAR. The treatment of inflation and unemployment as independent factors 
are unreasonable and unnecessary. In the FAVAR, these two variables are put in the 
first step as part of the large dataset to be extracted to factors, and the only observable 
variable is the federal funds rate. The FAVAR model will be described in details in 
Section 2. Second, although both the Bernanke and Bolvin (2003) and this paper are  
based on counterfactual monetary policy settings, the former focused on the 
comparison between machine generated monetary policy actions and actual  
monetary policies between January 1987 and December 1998. In contrast, our work 
focuses on whether active monetary policy actions are necessary. The investigation  
provides insights into the implementation of monetary policies not only for the U.S., 
but also for all central banks that control interest rates as their major monetary policy 
tool. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the FAVAR model 
and estimation method. Section 3 describes the dataset and illustrates the framework 
of application, which includes descriptions of hypothetical monetary policy scenarios 
and explanations of why these particular scenarios are chosen. Section 4 applies the 
2-step FAVAR model suggested by BBE (2005) to both hypothetical monetary 
policies and actual monetary policies. This section also reports the finding of 
comparisons of impulse response functions generated from the hypothetical scenarios 
and the actual monetary policies. In short, we find that major economic indicators are 
less volatile if the Federal Reserve Bank held a longer pause at a higher interest rate 
than if the Bank used an active monetary policy approach, and real economic 
activities are not affected in a serious manner. Inflation is still under control even if 
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the Federal Reserve Bank did not actively exert policy actions. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. FAVAR model 
The FAVAR model was developed in BBE (2005). This section illustrates the model 
in detail. The main advantage of the model is that BBE makes use of Stock and 
Watson (2002b)‟s dynamic factor model to summarize the information of a large 
dataset into several factors and include these factors in standard VAR settings. The 
model provides a solution to the dimension problem of the VAR analysis. 
Since our study applies the two-step estimation method described in BBE (2005), in 
which the factors are estimated by principal components prior to the estimation of the 
factor-augmented VAR, the following only describes the estimation of the two-step 
approach. The Gibbs sampling method in BBE (2005) was not chosen because it 
suffers from the additional structure it imposes which was not empirically supported 
in the BBE paper, and it is time consuming. 
 
2.1 The model 
Let Ft be a K1 vector of unobservable factors which can summarize most of the 
information contained in Xt which is an N1 stationary time series variable observed 
for t=1,…,T t; Yt is an M1 observable macroeconomic variable and is a subset of Xt.  
Ft can be interpreted as factors that affect many economic variables. These factors can 
be extracted from observations on the large information set in Xt.  The number of 
informational time series, N, is large and may be larger than T, the number of time 
periods, and is assumed to be much larger than K+M. It is further assumed that the  
information set is related to the unobserved factors, Ft, and the observable 
macroeconomic variables Yt: 
' ' ' 'f y
t t t tX F Y      (1) 
where f is an NK matrix of factor loadings, y is NM, t is an N1 vector of error 
terms that have mean zero and assumed to be weakly correlated. Equation (1) is the 
dynamic factor model developed by Stock and Watson (2002b). It implies that Xt is 
driven by both unobservable factors and observable macroeconomic variables, and 
therefore Yt and Ft can be correlated. Since Xt can contain lagged values, Ft can be 
understood as containing arbitrary lags of fundamental factors. An advantage of the 
static representation of the dynamic factor model of equation (1) is that it can be 
estimated by the principal component method (Stock and Watson, 2002b). 
The joint dynamics of (Ft,Yt) are given by 
  1
1
t t
t
t t
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 (2) 
where B(L) is a conformable lag polynomial of finite order d; et is an error term with 
mean zero and covariance matrix .  
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If the terms in B(L) that relate Yt to Ft-1 are all zero, equation (2) is a standard VAR in 
Yt; otherwise equation (2) is referred by BBE (2005) as a factor-augmented vector 
autoregression (FAVAR). If equation (2) is estimated as a standard VAR when the true 
system is a FAVAR, (that is, if the factors are omitted) then the estimates in the 
standard VAR system will be biased. 
 
2.2 Estimation of the model  
Since Ft is a vector of unobservable factors, equation (2) can only be estimated after 
Ft is derived. In this paper, we apply the two-step estimation procedure in BBE 
(2005). 
It is reasonable to believe that information contained in Xt can be summarized into 
several categories. We call these categories common components, Ct. In the first step 
of the two-step approach, we extract the first K+M principal components using all 
variables in Xt, and we get . However, any of the linear combinations underlying 
 could involve the policy instrument, which is part of Yt. Therefore it would be 
invalid to estimate a VAR of  and Yt. We have to remove the dependence of  on 
the policy instrument. This requires identifying variables in Xt that are not related to 
the policy shock. 
Since fast-moving variables in the dataset Xt, are highly sensitive to policy shocks, 
fast structural shocks and contemporaneous information, such as financial news and 
economic data release, BBE (2005) argue that there is high collinearity between the 
fast-moving variables and any policy shock. The logic implies that information 
contained in the fast-moving variables should be accounted for by the policy shock. 
On the contrary, slow-moving variables, for example real estate prices and sales, are 
assumed to be unaffected within the month by the policy shock, and these variables 
are marked with an asterisk in the Appendix. Xt is therefore split into slow-moving 
variables, the policy shock and fast-moving variables.  
As slow-moving variables are not related to the policy shock contemporaneously, the 
common components extracted from slow-moving variables, , are also not 
related to the policy shock contemporaneously.  
We thus form  such that 
 (3) 
We then remove the dependence of on the policy instrument to get the factors, , 
in equation (2) as 
 (4) 
where are principal components from Xt and comes from the result of equation 
(3). 
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Factors, , obtained in this way form a part of the space covered by that is not 
covered by tY , and therefore is now valid to be entered into VAR with tY . To identify 
unique factors against any rotation, restrictions are imposed on factors by ' /F F T I
1
.  
In the second step, we estimate the FAVAR in equation (2) which consists of  and 
Yt.  
Since the focus of this empirical work is to examine how monetary policy shocks 
affect the economy, the identification scheme in the VAR analysis focuses on 
identifying a single structural shock, that is the federal funds rate, Yt.. The monetary 
policy shock is ordered last and is the only innovation in the model. 
 
 
3. Application of FAVAR: Did the Fed overexert policy actions?  
Figure 1 shows the movements of the Federal Funds Target Rate between October 
1982 and October 2006. It includes the target rate under Alan Greenspan‟s 
chairmanship between August 11
th
 1987 and January 31
st
 2006. We can see that the 
Federal Reserve Bank moved the target Federal Funds Rates many times in one 
direction, and then “undid” the policy actions by going in the reverse direction after a 
pause. Many times in history, it is argued that that the Federal Reserve Bank had 
„overdone‟ its policy actions. This study is to analyze whether the central bank had 
overexerted the monetary policy actions in the interest rate cycle. 
We begin our analysis in June 1989 and end in January 1995. The period consists of 
an expansionary monetary policy, a pause, and then a contractionary monetary policy, 
i.e. period A-B, B-C and C-D in the Figure 1 respectively. The actual pause from B to 
C lasted for 16 months, after which the Federal Reserve Bank raised the Federal 
Funds Rate at a speed that was faster than the one it had used when it had cut the rate. 
After raising the Fed Funds Rate from the 3% level to the 6% level, the central bank 
cut the rate again at a much slower speed and intervening pauses pauses until 
September 1999. Since monetary policy mainly serves the purpose of stabilizing the 
economy in terms of the inflation rate and the unemployment rate, frequent policy 
actions and subsequent unwinding of actions might be inappropriate since the frequent 
policy actions may bring unnecessary volatility to the economy. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to suspect that the Federal Reserve Bank had overexerted the Federal 
Funds Rate cut before point B.  
To see if this claim is valid we construct hypothetical scenarios of longer pauses 
around B and C and apply the settings to the FAVAR model described in Section 2. 
We then compare the impulse response of the monetary policy actions of these 
scenarios to the impulse responses of historical policy actions.  
 
                                                 
1
 We can impose restrictions on the factor loadings or the factors. Either approach provides the same 
common component and the same factor space.  
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3.1 Data 
The dataset consists of monthly macroeconomic time series data from January 1975 to 
November 2006 for 120 variables in the U.S.. The data series are updated from the 
dataset used by BBE (2005) which ends in August 2001. The series are transformed to 
be stationary. The list of the series and their transformation are listed in Appendix A. 
Among the variables, there are 67 variables representing real activity, 17 variables 
relating to inflation or price and 36 monetary variables. The real activity group 
consists of variables related to industrial production, capacity utilization, 
manufacturers‟ inventories, retail inventories, retail sales, real personal consumption, 
real personal income, new housing starts, employment and average working hours. 
The inflation or price group is composed of consumer price indices and producer price 
indices. The monetary variable group includes money aggregate variables, short-term 
and long-term interest rates and interest rate spreads, major exchange rates and 
outstanding credit.  
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Figure 1. U.S. Target Fed Funds Rate 
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3.2 The Choice of Hypothetical Scenarios 
Since the purpose of this study is to analyze whether the Federal Reserve Bank 
overexerted monetary policy actions in the past, the hypothetical scenarios are 
constructed to undo the policy actions before the start of interest rate pause at point B.  
Two hypothetical scenarios are identified. Scenario 1 assumes the Federal Reserve 
Bank did not exert the last interest rate cut before the pause at point B. Scenario 2 
pushes this further to assume the Federal Reserve Bank did not exert the last two 
interest rate cut before the pause. 
Scenario 1 is a hypothetical setting depicting the scenario that the Federal Reserve 
Bank did not exert the last monetary policy action of the interest rate cut cycle in 
October 1992, and that it had started the pause of the Fed Funds Rate at 3.25% from 
September 1992 till March 1994; it then raised the Fed Funds Rate by 0.25% in April 
1994.  The corresponding historic monetary policy is that the Federal Reserve Bank 
held the Fed Funds Rate at 3.00% from October 1992 till February 1994, and then 
raised the rate by 0.25% in March and also in April. In short, Scenario 1 is a setting 
where the Federal Reserve Bank held the Fed Funds Rate constant for two more 
months at a rate that was 0.25% higher than it actually did. 
Scenario 2 assumes that the Federal Reserve Bank undid the monetary policy actions 
between August 1992 and May 1994. The hypothetical setting is that the Federal 
Reserve Bank had paused the Fed Funds Rate at 3.75% from July 1992 till May 1994, 
then raised the Fed Funds Rate by 0.25% in June 1994. The corresponding historic 
monetary policy is that the Federal Reserve Bank cut the Fed Funds Rate by 0.5% and 
by 0.25% in August and October 1992 respectively, then paused until February 1994, 
and then raised the rate by 0.25% in April and also in May and by 0.5% in June 1994. 
However, in order to compare the results in Scenario 1 and Scenario 2, the shock after 
May 1994 is set at 0.25%.  
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Number of factors 
To proceed to the FAVAR model stated above, it is important to know the number of 
factors to be incorporated in the VAR framework. Stock and Watson (2002a) 
suggested that the number of factors could be determined by an information criterion. 
Bai and Ng (2002) provided a criterion to determine the number of factors associated 
with the dataset, Xt only. However, BBE (2005) emphasized that the criterion 
developed by Bai and Ng (2002) did not address the issue of how many factors should 
enter in the VAR analysis in equation (2). In their paper, BBE (2005) tried different 
numbers of factors, specifically they tried K=1, 3, 5 and 7.  They showed that there 
was no qualitative difference in the impulse response functions with K=5 and 7. Stock 
and Watson (2005) extended the dataset and provided another estimation method to 
FAVAR that incorporated Bai and Ng (2002)‟s information criteria to determine the 
number of dynamic factors in Xt, and they found that the number of factors was 7. In 
addition to this finding they realized that there was little qualitative difference 
between their results and that in BBE in terms of the impulse response functions when 
BBE applied K= 5. Nevertheless, the information criteria developed by Bai and Ng 
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(2002) can only determine the number of factors in Xt but not in the VAR of equation 
(2).  
In order to justify for the number of factors used in the FAVAR model, our study tries 
to use the conventional information criteria for standard VAR in the FAVAR. AIC, HQ 
and SC are reported in Table 1 below. In order to check for the robustness of these 
criteria we extend the candidates of K to K=1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13. As we can see from 
Table 1, AIC and HQ decrease with the number of factors, and therefore we cannot 
find the optimal number of factors using AIC and HQ. One of the reasons might be 
that AIC and HQ do not impose enough penalty to determine the optimal number of 
factors in the VAR in equation (2). On the contrary, using SC as the information 
criterion we find that the number of factors in equation (2) is 7. We therefore choose 
K=7 throughout the analysis. 
 
Table 1. Information Criteria applied to FAVAR in equation (2) 
 
K AIC HQ SC
1 -1.0521 -0.8433 -0.5242
3 -5.2523 -4.4323 -3.1794
5 -7.9813 -6.1479 -3.3467
7 -11.7596 -8.5105 -3.5464
9 -14.5257 -9.4587 -1.7170
11 -17.2325 -9.9454 1.1885
13 -20.8133 -10.9038 4.2369  
 
 
4.2 Empirical Results 
We follow BBE (2005) in estimating the FAVAR. Using conventional information 
criteria, the models are estimated with thirteen lags, which, given the nature of 
monthly data  is the same as the BBE (2005) model.  
The following compares the impulse response functions of major economic activities 
in the hypothetical scenarios described in Section 3.2 with impulse response functions 
in the corresponding scenarios.  
Figure 2 compares 20 impulse response functions of hypothetical and historical data 
in Scenario 1, and Figure 3 compares those in Scenario 2. These twenty variables are 
chosen to examine the impact of monetary policy on the entire economy.. In fact, we 
can compare all the 120 impulse response functions. The results of the study are 
shown below. 
At first glance, as expected we see larger differences in the impulse response 
functions of the hypothetical and historical data in Figure 3 than in Figure 2. This is 
due to the assumption that the Federal Reserve Bank pursued a longer pause in the 
hypothetical situation under Scenario 2 than under Scenario 1.  
If we look at Figure 2 and Figure 3 (the magnified graphs following each figure) we 
find that the impulse responses of real economic activities in the hypothetical 
situations are higher than those of historical monetary policy. These variables include 
industrial production, personal consumption, durable goods consumption, non-durable 
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goods consumption and housing starts. These results meet our expectation that real 
economic activities, in general, would be suppressed by tightening monetary policies, 
but are affected to a lesser extent under the hypothetical situation when there is no 
“over-exertion” of previous monetary policies.  
The impulse response of unemployment in the hypothetical situation is less volatile 
than that of the historical situation. There are a few more variables that show similar 
responses, for example, capacity utility rate, housing starts and the NAPM new orders 
index.  
Although the CPI does fall with a short lag after the shock, it should be noted that the 
impulse responses of CPI, commodity price index and average hourly earnings are 
higher in the hypothetical situation than those of historical monetary policy.  
Figure 3 shows that in Scenario 2, the average hourly earnings start to fall after 42 
months in the hypothetical situation but only after 24 months in historical situation. It 
takes a longer period to bring the wage rate down under the hypothetical tightening of 
monetary policy with a longer pause and a higher level of the Fed Funds Rate,  
compared to active monetary policy. This implies that a non-active monetary policy 
approach may not be appropriate to fight cost-push inflation which is usually caused 
by higher expected wage in the near future. 
Overall the impulse response functions are in accordance with the implications of  
macroeconomic theory. The lower prices and lower levels of real economic activities 
under the historical situation might be the result of a few tightening policy actions 
before the shock, and therefore the responses of the CPI and industrial production 
reflect the accumulated effects of these tightening policies. Therefore, by comparing 
the hypothetical non-active monetary policy situation with the historical active 
monetary policy situation, we can say that the Federal Reserve Bank over-exerted 
policy actions in the past. Using the FAVAR our study shows that inflation would still 
have been under control even if the Federal Reserve Bank had not actively cut the 
Federal Funds Rate. However, inflation would not have gone down as much under the 
non-active monetary policy. We show that the costs of an active monetary policy 
approach are that some real economic activities are more adversely affected and other 
variables become more volatile. 
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Figure 2. Comparison of Impulse Response Functions of Historical Monetary Policy 
and Scenario 1 (FFR, Industrial Production). 
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Figure 2 (continued). Comparison of Impulse Response Functions of Historical 
Monetary Policy and Scenario 1 (CPI, 3M Treasury Bills). 
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Figure 2 (continued). Comparison of Impulse Response Functions of Historical 
Monetary Policy and Scenario 1 (5-yr Treasury Bonds, Monetary Base). 
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Figure 2 (continued). Comparison of Impulse Response Functions of Historical 
Monetary Policy and Scenario 1 (M2, Yen/USD Exchange Rate). 
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Figure 2 (continued). Comparison of Impulse Response Functions of Historical 
Monetary Policy and Scenario 1 (Commodity Price Index, Capacity Utilization Rate). 
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Figure 2 (continued). Comparison of Impulse Response Functions of Historical 
Monetary Policy and Scenario 1 (Personal Consumption, Durable Consumption). 
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Figure 2 (continued). Comparison of Impulse Response Functions of Historical 
Monetary Policy and Scenario 1 (Non-Durable Consumption, Unemployment). 
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Figure 2 (continued). Comparison of Impulse Response Functions of Historical 
Monetary Policy and Scenario 1 (Employment, Average Hourly Earnings). 
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Figure 2 (continued). Comparison of Impulse Response Functions of Historical 
Monetary Policy and Scenario 1 (Housing Starts, New Orders). 
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Figure 2 (continued). Comparison of Impulse Response Functions of Historical 
Monetary Policy and Scenario 1 (Dividends, Consumer Expectation). 
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Figure 3. Comparison of Impulse Response Functions of Historical Monetary Policy 
and Scenario 2 (FFR, Industrial Production). 
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Figure 3 (continued). Comparison of Impulse Response Functions of Historical 
Monetary Policy and Scenario 2 (CPI, 3M Treasury Yield). 
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Figure 3 (continued). Comparison of Impulse Response Functions of Historical 
Monetary Policy and Scenario 2 (5yr Treasury Yield, Monetary Base). 
 
 
  Last Revised 7/30/2011  4:55:53 PM 
 Page 24 of 35 
Figure 3 (continued). Comparison of Impulse Response Functions of Historical 
Monetary Policy and Scenario 2 (M2, Yen/USD Exchange Rate). 
 
 
  Last Revised 7/30/2011  4:55:53 PM 
 Page 25 of 35 
Figure 3 (continued). Comparison of Impulse Response Functions of Historical 
Monetary Policy and Scenario 2 (Commodity Price Index, Capacity Utilization Rate). 
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Figure 3 (continued).Comparison of Impulse Response Functions of Historical 
Monetary Policy and Scenario 2 (Personal Consumption, Durables Consumption). 
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Figure 3 (continued). Comparison of Impulse Response Functions of Historical 
Monetary Policy and Scenario 2 (Non-Durables Consumption, Unemployment). 
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Figure 3 (continued). Comparison of Impulse Response Functions of Historical 
Monetary Policy and Scenario 2 (Employment, Average Hourly Earnings). 
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Figure 3 (continued). Comparison of Impulse Response Functions of Historical 
Monetary Policy and Scenario 2 (Housing Starts, New Orders). 
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Figure 3 (continued). Comparison of Impulse Response Functions of Historical 
Monetary Policy and Scenario 2 (Dividends, Consumer Expectations). 
 
 
  Last Revised 7/30/2011  4:55:53 PM 
 Page 31 of 35 
5. Conclusion  
This study investigates whether active monetary policy actions are necessary. We 
construct hypothetical monetary policy actions where the Federal Reserve Bank held 
the Fed Funds Rate stationary at a higher level than the actual historical active 
monetary policy actions.  
The extra information generated by the FAVAR allows us to look at the effect of a 
monetary policy shock on more than a hundred impulse response functions of 
economic variables. This leads to a better understanding of the dynamics of monetary 
policy actions on interest rates, the financial sector and the real activities of the 
economy.  
Using FAVAR with a large dataset, this study finds that a less active monetary policy 
would also control inflation but would produce a less negative impact on real 
economic activities, and that major economic variables would be less volatile in a 
48-month horizon. However, the wage rate seems to be more sticky under the 
non-active monetary policy approach, and might not be appropriate for curbing 
cost-push inflation. This provides insights into the implementation of monetary 
policies not only for the U.S., but also for other central banks tha use the manipulation 
of the interest rates as their major monetary policy tool.  
However, the identification of factors in the FAVAR model is still to be developed and 
would be important for future research.  
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Appendix A -Data Description  
All series are downloaded from Jean Boivin website, 
http://neumann.hec.ca/pages/jean.boivin/mypapers/BBE_Ddisk.zip. The 
transformation codes are: 1 – no transformation; 2 – first difference; 4 – logarithm; 
5 – first difference of logarithm. An asterisk, „*‟, denotes the assumption of 
slow-moving variable in the estimation.  
 
Real output and income   
1 IPP* 1959:01-2001:08 5 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION: PRODUCTS, TOTAL (1992=100,SA) 
2 IPF* 1959:01-2001:08 5 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION: FINAL PRODUCTS (1992=100,SA) 
3 IPC* 1959:01-2001:08 5 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION: CONSUMER GOODS (1992=100,SA) 
4 IPCD* 1959:01-2001:08 5 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION: DURABLE CONS. GOODS (1992=100,SA) 
5 IPCN* 1959:01-2001:08 5 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION: NONDURABLE CONS. GOODS (1992=100,SA) 
6 IPE* 1959:01-2001:08 5 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION: BUSINESS EQUIPMENT (1992=100,SA)  
7 IPI* 1959:01-2001:08 5 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION: INTERMEDIATE PRODUCTS (1992=100,SA) 
8 IPM* 1959:01-2001:08 5 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION: MATERIALS (1992=100,SA) 
9 IPMD* 1959:01-2001:08 5 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION: DURABLE GOODS MATERIALS (1992=100,SA) 
10 IPMND* 1959:01-2001:08 5 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION: NONDUR. GOODS MATERIALS  (1992=100,SA) 
11 IPMFG* 1959:01-2001:08 5 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION: MANUFACTURING (1992=100,SA)  
12 IPD* 1959:01-2001:08 5 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION: DURABLE MANUFACTURING (1992=100,SA) 
13 IPN* 1959:01-2001:08 5 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION: NONDUR. MANUFACTURING (1992=100,SA) 
14 IPMIN* 1959:01-2001:08 5 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION: MINING (1992=100,SA)  
15 IPUT* 1959:01-2001:08 5 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION: UTILITIES (1992-=100,SA) 
16 IP* 1959:01-2001:08 5 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION: TOTAL INDEX (1992=100,SA) 
17 IPXMCA* 1959:01-2001:08 1 CAPACITY UTIL RATE: MANUFAC.,TOTAL(% OF CAPACITY,SA) (FRB)  
18 PMI* 1959:01-2001:08 1 PURCHASING MANAGERS' INDEX (SA) 
19 PMP* 1959:01-2001:08 1 NAPM PRODUCTION INDEX (PERCENT) 
20 GMPYQ* 1959:01-2001:08 5 PERSONAL INCOME (CHAINED) (SERIES #52) (BIL 92$,SAAR) 
21 GMYXPQ* 1959:01-2001:08 5 PERSONAL INC. LESS TRANS. PAYMENTS (CHAINED) (#51) (BIL 92$,SAAR) 
Employment and hours   
22 LHEL* 1959:01-2001:08 5 INDEX OF HELP-WANTED ADVERTISING IN NEWSPAPERS (1967=100;SA) 
23 LHELX* 1959:01-2001:08 4 EMPLOYMENT: RATIO; HELP-WANTED ADS:NO. UNEMPLOYED CLF  
24 LHEM* 1959:01-2001:08 5 CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE: EMPLOYED, TOTAL  (THOUS.,SA) 
25 LHNAG* 1959:01-2001:08 5 CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE: EMPLOYED, NONAG.INDUSTRIES (THOUS.,SA) 
26 LHUR* 1959:01-2001:08 1 UNEMPLOYMENT RATE: ALL WORKERS, 16 YEARS & OVER (%,SA) 
27 LHU680* 1959:01-2001:08 1 UNEMPLOY.BY DURATION: AVERAGE(MEAN)DURATION IN WEEKS (SA) 
28 LHU5* 1959:01-2001:08 1 UNEMPLOY.BY DURATION: PERS UNEMPL.LESS THAN 5 WKS (THOUS.,SA) 
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29 LHU14* 1959:01-2001:08 1 UNEMPLOY.BY DURATION: PERS UNEMPL.5 TO 14 WKS (THOUS.,SA) 
30 LHU15* 1959:01-2001:08 1 UNEMPLOY.BY DURATION: PERS UNEMPL.15 WKS + (THOUS.,SA) 
31 LHU26* 1959:01-2001:08 1 UNEMPLOY.BY DURATION: PERS UNEMPL.15 TO 26 WKS (THOUS.,SA) 
32 LPNAG* 1959:01-2001:08 5 EMPLOYEES ON NONAG. PAYROLLS: TOTAL (THOUS.,SA) 
33 LP* 1959:01-2001:08 5 EMPLOYEES ON NONAG PAYROLLS: TOTAL, PRIVATE (THOUS,SA) 
34 LPGD* 1959:01-2001:08 5 EMPLOYEES ON NONAG. PAYROLLS:  GOODS-PRODUCING (THOUS.,SA) 
35 LPMI* 1959:01-2001:08 5 EMPLOYEES ON NONAG. PAYROLLS: MINING (THOUS.,SA) 
36 LPCC* 1959:01-2001:08 5 EMPLOYEES ON NONAG. PAYROLLS: CONTRACT CONSTRUC. (THOUS.,SA) 
37 LPEM* 1959:01-2001:08 5 EMPLOYEES ON NONAG. PAYROLLS: MANUFACTURING (THOUS.,SA) 
38 LPED* 1959:01-2001:08 5 EMPLOYEES ON NONAG. PAYROLLS: DURABLE GOODS (THOUS.,SA) 
39 LPEN* 1959:01-2001:08 5 EMPLOYEES ON NONAG. PAYROLLS: NONDURABLE GOODS (THOUS.,SA) 
40 LPSP* 1959:01-2001:08 5 EMPLOYEES ON NONAG. PAYROLLS: SERVICE-PRODUCING (THOUS.,SA) 
41 LPTU* 1959:01-2001:08 5 EMPLOYEES ON NONAG. PAYROLLS: TRANS. & PUBLIC UTIL. (THOUS.,SA) 
42 LPT* 1959:01-2001:08 5 EMPLOYEES ON NONAG. PAYROLLS: WHOLESALE & RETAIL (THOUS.,SA) 
43 LPFR* 1959:01-2001:08 5 EMPLOYEES ON NONAG. PAYROLLS: FINANCE,INS.&REAL EST (THOUS.,SA 
44 LPS* 1959:01-2001:08 5 EMPLOYEES ON NONAG. PAYROLLS: SERVICES (THOUS.,SA) 
45 LPGOV* 1959:01-2001:08 5 EMPLOYEES ON NONAG. PAYROLLS: GOVERNMENT (THOUS.,SA) 
46 LPHRM* 1959:01-2001:08 1 AVG. WEEKLY HRS. OF PRODUCTION WKRS.: MANUFACTURING (SA) 
47 LPMOSA* 1959:01-2001:08 1 AVG. WEEKLY HRS. OF PROD. WKRS.: MFG.,OVERTIME HRS. (SA) 
48 PMEMP* 1959:01-2001:08 1 NAPM EMPLOYMENT INDEX (PERCENT)  
Consumption    
49 GMCQ* 1959:01-2001:08 5 PERSONAL CONSUMPTION EXPEND (CHAINED) - TOTAL (BIL 92$,SAAR) 
50 GMCDQ* 1959:01-2001:08 5 PERSONAL CONSUMPTION EXPEND (CHAINED) - TOT. DUR. (BIL 96$,SAAR) 
51 GMCNQ* 1959:01-2001:08 5 PERSONAL CONSUMPTION EXPEND (CHAINED) - NONDUR. (BIL 92$,SAAR)  
52 GMCSQ* 1959:01-2001:08 5 PERSONAL CONSUMPTION EXPEND (CHAINED) - SERVICES (BIL 92$,SAAR)  
53 GMCANQ* 1959:01-2001:08 5 PERSONAL CONS EXPEND (CHAINED) - NEW CARS (BIL 96$,SAAR) 
Housing starts and sales   
54 HSFR 1959:01-2001:08 4 HOUSING STARTS: NONFARM(1947-58);TOT.(1959-)(THOUS.,SA  
55 HSNE 1959:01-2001:08 4 HOUSING STARTS: NORTHEAST (THOUS.U.)S.A. 
56 HSMW 1959:01-2001:08 4 HOUSING STARTS: MIDWEST(THOUS.U.)S.A. 
57 HSSOU 1959:01-2001:08 4 HOUSING STARTS: SOUTH (THOUS.U.)S.A. 
58 HSWST 1959:01-2001:08 4 HOUSING STARTS: WEST (THOUS.U.)S.A. 
59 HSBR 1959:01-2001:08 4 HOUSING AUTHORIZED: TOTAL NEW PRIV HOUSING (THOUS.,SAAR) 
60 HMOB 1959:01-2001:08 4 MOBILE HOMES: MANUFACTURERS' SHIPMENTS (THOUS.OF UNITS,SAAR) 
Real inventories, orders and unfilled orders 
61 PMNV 1959:01-2001:08 1 NAPM INVENTORIES INDEX (PERCENT) 
62 PMNO 1959:01-2001:08 1 NAPM NEW ORDERS INDEX (PERCENT) 
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63 PMDEL 1959:01-2001:08 1 NAPM VENDOR DELIVERIES INDEX (PERCENT) 
64 MOCMQ 1959:01-2001:08 5 NEW ORDERS (NET) - CONSUMER GOODS & MATERIALS, 1992 $ (BCI) 
5 MSONDQ 1959:01-2001:08 5 NEW ORDERS, NONDEFENSE CAPITAL GOODS, IN 1992 DOLLARS(BCI) 
Stock prices    
66 FSNCOM 1959:01-2001:08 5 NYSE COMMON STOCK PRICE INDEX: COMPOSITE (12/31/65=50) 
67 FSPCOM 1959:01-2001:08 5 S&P'S COMMON STOCK PRICE INDEX: COMPOSITE (1941-43=10) 
68 FSPIN 1959:01-2001:08 5 S&P'S COMMON STOCK PRICE INDEX: INDUSTRIALS (1941-43=10) 
69 FSPCAP 1959:01-2001:08 5 S&P'S COMMON STOCK PRICE INDEX: CAPITAL GOODS (1941-43=10) 
70 FSPUT 1959:01-2001:08 5 S&P'S COMMON STOCK PRICE INDEX: UTILITIES (1941-43=10)  
71 FSDXP 1959:01-2001:08 1 S&P'S COMPOSITE COMMON STOCK: DIVIDEND YIELD (% PER ANNUM) 
72 FSPXE 1959:01-2001:08 1 S&P'S COMPOSITE COMMON STOCK: PRICE-EARNINGS RATIO (%,NSA)  
Exchange rates    
73 EXRSW 1959:01-2001:08 5 FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATE: SWITZERLAND (SWISS FRANC PER U.S.$) 
74 EXRJAN 1959:01-2001:08 5 FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATE: JAPAN (YEN PER U.S.$) 
75 EXRUK 1959:01-2001:08 5 FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATE: UNITED KINGDOM (CENTS PER POUND) 
76 EXRCAN 1959:01-2001:08 5 FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATE: CANADA (CANADIAN $ PER U.S.$) 
Interest rates    
77 FYFF 1959:01-2001:08 1 INTEREST RATE: FEDERAL FUNDS (EFFECTIVE) (% PER ANNUM,NSA) 
78 FYGM3 1959:01-2001:08 1 INTEREST RATE: U.S.TREASURY BILLS,SEC MKT,3-MO.(% PER ANN,NSA) 
79 FYGM6 1959:01-2001:08 1 INTEREST RATE: U.S.TREASURY BILLS,SEC MKT,6-MO.(% PER ANN,NSA) 
80 FYGT1 1959:01-2001:08 1 INTEREST RATE: U.S.TREASURY CONST MATUR. ,1-YR.(% PER ANN,NSA) 
81 FYGT5 1959:01-2001:08 1 INTEREST RATE: U.S.TREASURY CONST MATUR., 5-YR.(%  PER ANN,NSA) 
82 FYGT10 1959:01-2001:08 1 INTEREST RATE: U.S.TREASURY CONST MATUR.,10-YR.(% PER ANN,NSA) 
83 FYAAAC 1959:01-2001:08 1 BOND YIELD: MOODY'S AAA CORPORATE (% PER ANNUM) 
84 FYBAAC 1959:01-2001:08 1 BOND YIELD: MOODY'S BAA CORPORATE (% PER ANNUM) 
85 SFYGM3 1959:01-2001:08 1 Spread FYGM3 - FYFF  
86 SFYGM6 1959:01-2001:08 1 Spread FYGM6 - FYFF  
87 SFYGT1 1959:01-2001:08 1 Spread FYGT1 - FYFF 
88 SFYGT5 1959:01-2001:08 1 Spread FYGT5 - FYFF 
89 SFYGT10 1959:01-2001:08 1 Spread FYGT10 - FYFF 
90 SFYAAAC 1959:01-2001:08 1 Spread FYAAAC - FYFF 
91 SFYBAAC 1959:01-2001:08 1 Spread FYBAAC - FYFF 
Money and Credit quantity aggregates 
92 FM1 1959:01-2001:08 5 MONEY STOCK: M1 (BIL$,SA) 
93 FM2 1959:01-2001:08 5 MONEY STOCK:M2 (BIL$, SA) 
94 FM3 1959:01-2001:08 5 MONEY STOCK: M3 (BIL$,SA) 
95 FM2DQ 1959:01-2001:08 5 MONEY SUPPLY -M2 IN 1992 DOLLARS (BCI) 
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96 FMFBA 1959:01-2001:08 5 MONETARY BASE, ADJ FOR RESERVE REQUIREMENT CHANGES(MIL$,SA) 
97 FMRRA 1959:01-2001:08 5 DEPOSITORY INST RESERVES:TOTAL,ADJ FOR RES. REQ CHGS(MIL$,SA) 
98 FMRNBA 1959:01-2001:08 5 DEPOSITORY INST RESERVES:NONBOR. ,ADJ RES REQ CHGS(MIL$,SA) 
99 FCLNQ 1959:01-2001:08 5 COMMERCIAL & INDUST. LOANS OUSTANDING IN  1992 DOLLARS (BCI) 
100 FCLBMC 1959:01-2001:08 1 WKLY RPLG COM. BANKS: NET CHANGE COM & IND. LOANS(BIL$,SAAR) 
101 CCINRV 1959:01-2001:08 5 CONSUMER CREDIT OUTSTANDING NONREVOLVING G19 
Price indexes    
102 PMCP 1959:01-2001:08 1 NAPM COMMODITY PRICES INDEX (PERCENT) 
103 PWFSA* 1959:01-2001:08 5 PRODUCER PRICE INDEX: FINISHED GOODS (82=100,SA) 
104 PWFCSA* 1959:01-2001:08 5 PRODUCER PRICE INDEX:FINISHED CONSUMER GOODS (82=100,SA) 
105 PWIMSA* 1959:01-2001:08 5 PRODUCER PRICE INDEX:INTERMED MAT.SUP & COMPONENTS(82=100,SA) 
106 PWCMSA* 1959:01-2001:08 5 PRODUCER PRICE INDEX:CRUDE MATERIALS (82=100,SA) 
107 PSM99Q* 1959:01-2001:08 5 INDEX OF SENSITIVE MATERIALS PRICES (1990=100)(BCI-99A) 
108 PUNEW* 1959:01-2001:08 5 CPI-U: ALL ITEMS (82-84=100,SA)  
109 PU83* 1959:01-2001:08 5 CPI-U: APPAREL & UPKEEP (82-84=100,SA) 
110 PU84* 1959:01-2001:08 5 CPI-U: TRANSPORTATION (82-84=100,SA)  
111 PU85* 1959:01-2001:08 5 CPI-U: MEDICAL CARE (82-84=100,SA) 
112 PUC* 1959:01-2001:08 5 CPI-U: COMMODITIES (82-84=100,SA) 
113 PUCD* 1959:01-2001:08 5 CPI-U: DURABLES (82-84=100,SA) 
114 PUS* 1959:01-2001:08 5 CPI-U: SERVICES (82-84=100,SA) 
115 PUXF* 1959:01-2001:08 5 CPI-U: ALL ITEMS LESS FOOD (82-84=100,SA) 
116 PUXHS* 1959:01-2001:08 5 CPI-U: ALL ITEMS LESS SHELTER (82-84=100,SA) 
117 PUXM* 1959:01-2001:08 5 CPI-U: ALL ITEMS LESS MEDICAL CARE (82-84=100,SA) 
Average hourly earnings   
118 LEHCC* 1959:01-2001:08 5 AVG HR EARNINGS OF CONSTR WKRS: CONSTRUCTION ($,SA) 
119 LEHM* 1959:01-2001:08 5 AVG HR EARNINGS OF PROD WKRS: MANUFACTURING ($,SA) 
Miscellaneous    
120 HHSNTN 1959:01-2001:08 1 U.OF MICH. INDEX OF CONSUMER EXPECTATIONS(BCD-83) 
 
